There are no two ways about it, and one should state the truth unequivocally: the Twenty-Seventh Amendment Assault on the Constitution has a singular purpose: to consolidate power in the hands of the military establishment by restructuring the judiciary, formalising military dominance, and granting lifetime immunity to those at the top of the political and military hierarchy.
At its core is the creation of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).
This new court will take over all constitutional matters, including the interpretation of the Constitution, disputes between governments, election challenges, and petitions related to fundamental rights. All ongoing constitutional cases in the Supreme Court will be transferred to the FCC.
In short, the Supreme Court will lose its constitutional jurisdiction and will only hear routine civil and criminal appeals.
The FCC will be above every court in the country. Its rulings will bind the Supreme Court and all High Courts, but it will not be bound by the previous Supreme Court precedents.
This effectively strips the Supreme Court of its status as Pakistan’s highest judicial authority.
The structure of the new court ensures direct political control:
The President and Prime Minister will play central roles in the appointment of the judges, including the Chief Justice of the FCC, while the Parliament will decide the number of judges.
The Chief Justice of the FCC will serve a three-year term, a tenure that keeps the position dependent on those who appoint it.
The FCC Chief Justice will head both the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Judicial Council, the bodies that pick and discipline judges, giving the ruling party direct control over judicial appointments and disciplinary proceedings.
High Court judges can be transferred to other provinces without their consent. Any judge refusing such a transfer will be retired automatically.
Supreme Court judges can be appointed to the FCC by the government, and refusal to accept the appointment will result in immediate retirement.
This gives the government complete leverage over the judiciary. Judges who comply will remain in service; those who dissent will be removed.
Judicial independence, already weakened, will effectively end: an independent judiciary would be replaced by a body handpicked by the ruling regime.
The so-called amendment virtually removes the Supreme Court from the constitutional framework and replaces it with a court designed to function under executive influence.
The other major section of the amendment deals with the armed forces. It makes sweeping changes to Article 243, which governs command of the military.
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) will be abolished and replaced by a new position, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF).
From November 27, 2025, the Chief of Army Staff will take on this new role, becoming the constitutional head of all three services — Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Moreover, the Prime Minister, acting on the CDF’s recommendation, will appoint the Commander of the National Strategic Command — who must be an army officer — to oversee Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic assets.
This means civilian leaders will be sidelined in key decisions and lose influence over matters involving Pakistan’s most sensitive arsenal. Control of the country’s nuclear weapons will move entirely under the Army’s domain.
The amendment also introduces lifetime ranks and privileges for officers promoted to five-star status.
Field Marshals, Marshals of the Air Force, and Admirals of the Fleet will retain rank, uniform, and privileges for life, and can only be removed through an impeachment process by the entire Parliament.
These officers will also enjoy constitutional immunity similar to that of the President, effectively placing them above the law.
These provisions clearly benefit the current Field Marshal, Asim Munir, whose extraordinary promotion earlier this year is now being entrenched in law. The amendment makes his position permanent and untouchable.
The 27th Amendment grants lifetime criminal immunity to the President of Pakistan, shielding the head of state from any criminal proceedings even after they leave office.
This creates a structure where the top offices of the country, both civilian and military, operate without threat of legal accountability.
These changes are not isolated.
They follow a consistent pattern that began after the military-orchestrated ouster of the democratically elected government in 2022. Since then, Pakistan’s institutions have been systematically restructured to secure the interests of those who control the state from outside the constitutional order.
The amendment’s political context reinforces this reading.
The Supreme Court, the last remaining institution with any capacity to check executive or military power, will be sidelined.
Judges will serve at the behest of a government that has been imposed at the behest of the military.
The military, already the most dominant institution in the country, will now be constitutionally superior to all others.
And the top of the civil-military hierarchy will enjoy permanent immunity from accountability.
It is no coincidence that the 27th Amendment is being pushed just days before Gen. Asim Munir’s scheduled retirement. It provides the legal architecture that enables, protects and prolongs Asim Munir’s hold on power, opening routes for an extended or effectively open-ended tenure and immunity.
The 27th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan effectively rewrites Pakistan’s system of government. It removes the last pretence of separation between institutions and replaces it with a formalised structure of subordination.
Power will rest where it has always been concentrated: with an unelected establishment that long controlled the state from the shadows, now shielded by constitutional legitimacy.
In response to the passage of the amendment, two senior judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Athar Minallah, submitted their resignations to President Asif Ali Zardari on 13 November 2025. Both framed their decisions as matters of principle. Justice Shah described the amendment as “a serious attack on the Constitution of Pakistan … it abolishes the Supreme Court … and subjects the judiciary to executive control,” while Justice Minallah stated that “the Constitution that I swore to uphold … is no more,” and what remains is “a mere shadow.”
On 15th November 2025, Lahore High Court’s Justice Shams Mehmood followed suit and resigned citing concerns over judicial independence post 27th Amendment to the Constitution.
Former attorney general of Pakistan Makhdoom Ali Khan tendered his resignation from the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan to CJP Afridi.
“When you sought my consent to be a member of the commission, I accepted without a second thought.
“The Constitution, by then, had been amended for the 26th time. I could see despondence on the once shining faces of promising young lawyers. I continued to believe, however, albeit without cause, that it remained possible to negotiate the bends and avoid a free fall. The realists cautioned that I was out of touch.
“The habits of a lifetime take time to die, however. These made me think that with technique, with finesse and with reason, persuasion will find a way. Advocacy will break through. The institution though battered and holed had not keeled over. And while it was afloat so was hope. It would of course require advocacy beyond ability which was possible given the extraordinary motivation. It always is,” he said.
However, the 27th Constitutional Amendment had “sunk that ship”.
He added, “It has scuttled whatever was left of an independent judiciary. That being so, I cannot continue to be a member of an institution erected on the promise to reform the law. No law reform is possible or can be effective without an independent judiciary. To continue in these circumstances would be to perpetuate the worst fraud possible: a fraud on oneself. I can go on but that would serve no purpose … I, therefore, thank you for the opportunity but confess my inability to continue. I resign.”